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Implicit attitudes about social groups persist independently of explicit beliefs and can
influence not only social behavior, but also medical and legal practices. Although examples
presented in the laboratory can alter such implicit attitudes, it is unclear whether the
same influence is exerted by real-world exemplars. Following the 2008 US election,
Plant et al. reported that the Implicit Association Test or “IAT” revealed a decrease in
negative implicit attitudes toward African-Americans. However, a large-scale study also
employing the IAT found little evidence for a change in implicit attitudes pre- and post-
election. Here we present evidence that the 2008 US election may have facilitated at
least a temporary change in implicit racial attitudes in the US. Our results rely on the
Affective Lexical Priming Score or “ALPS” and pre- and post-election measurements
for both US and non-US participants. US students who, pre-election, exhibited negative
associations with black faces, post-election showed positive associationswith black faces.
Canadian students pre- and post-election did not show a similar shift. To account for
these findings, we posit that the socio-cognitive processes underlying ALPS are different
from those underlying the IAT. Acknowledging that we cannot form a causal link between
an intervening real-world event and laboratory-measured implicit attitudes, we speculate
that our findings may be driven by the fact that the 2008 election campaign included
extremely positive media coverage of President Obama and prominently featured his face
in association with positive words—similar to the structure of ALPS. Even so, our real-
world finding adds to the literature demonstrating the malleability of implicit attitudes
and has implications for how we understand the socio-cognitive mechanisms underlying
stereotypes.
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INTRODUCTION
Implicit biases are attitudes or preferences that are automatic and
occur without conscious control (Greenwald et al., 1998). Over
the past decade, tests of implicit racial attitudes have found that
participants (on average) possess negative associations toward
black faces and African-Americans (Phelps et al., 2000; Phelps,
2001; Richeson et al., 2003; Lieberman et al., 2005; Trawalter
et al., 2008). Critically, these findings hold across a variety of
implicit measures (Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998;
Lebrecht et al., 2009), as well as the race of the participant (Nosek
et al., 2002). At the same time, these attitudes are apparently
malleable and can be altered at the individual level through labo-
ratory manipulations that rely on training or priming (Kawakami
et al., 2000; Dasgupta and Greenwald, 2001; Correll et al., 2007;
Lebrecht et al., 2009). However in studies without direct efforts
or modifications to reduce bias, participants consistently main-
tain a negative association to black faces (Nosek et al., 2002;
Lieberman et al., 2005; Green et al., 2007; Schmidt and Nosek,
2010).
With respect to short-term changes in attitudes, recent socio-
cognitive studies have elucidatedmany of the factors that can alter
an individual participant’s implicit attitudes. A comprehensive
review by Blair and colleagues includes a meta-analysis of such
studies and concludes there is a strong case for the short-term
malleability of attitudes in response to the perceiver’s motives
and strategies (Blair, 2002). Certain factors that can moderate
bias, such as self or social motives or threatened self-esteem, pro-
vide relevant theory regarding suppression of automatic stereo-
types. In particular, priming studies using salient stereotypic
vs. non-stereotypic social examples (e.g., African-Americans in
gang setting vs. African-Americans at an outside BBQ) or salient
positive vs. negative individual exemplars (e.g., Bill Cosby vs.
OJ Simpson) have both been shown to modulate expression of
African-American stereotypes, (Dasgupta and Greenwald, 2001;
Wittenbrink et al., 2001). Such findings point to the potential
of exposure for modulating implicit attitudes over the short-
term. Moreover, the fact that examples of prominent individuals
have some efficacy hints at the long-term factors that may be
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able to influence implicit attitudes within real-world popula-
tions given the right confluence of conditions (e.g., saliency,
degree of counter-stereotypicality, widespread awareness of the
exemplar, etc.).
In this paper we build on such results in describing a recent
change in implicit attitudes that apparently arose naturally within
the general population. Because of the real-world nature of our
findings, it is impossible for us to definitively identify any causal
relationship between changes observed in the laboratory over
time and real-world events. Indeed, there has been some debate
in the literature as to whether such effects exist at all (Schmidt
and Nosek, 2010). At the same time, our data is strengthened
by the fact that it was coincidentally collected prior to and fol-
lowing a highly-salient and widely-publicized social milestone
in US history—the 2008 election of the first African-American
US President. As such, we base our speculative interpretation
of our results on recent socio-cognitive studies (Cooper, 2009)
and econometric analyses (Dubner, 2011) that have attempted
to address the impact of this event. To help account for why a
singular counter-stereotypic exemplar might have a significant
impact on implicit racial attitudes, we propose a cognitive-process
account for how implicit attitudes are both initially anchored and
how they may change over time. As one component, we posit
that racial attitudes implicitly develop in conjunction with the
automatic evaluation of human faces along many non-perceptual
dimensions. That is, when observers visually perceive a face they
unconsciously assign it a positive or negative “valence” based on
their prior associations with that face and faces of a similar cate-
gory (e.g., faces of the same race, age, sex, etc.). This evaluation of
visual input and valence association occurs very early and ubiqui-
tously in visual processing (Bar et al., 2006; Barrett and Bar, 2009).
Consequently, the resultant associations, including valence, have
ample opportunity to influence processing within other social
and cognitive systems.
Faces, as well as objects more generally, accumulate affective
information both from environmental factors (e.g., context and
the opinions of others; Bar et al., 2006) and from one’s affective
reactions (e.g., one’s somatic responses; Barrett and Bar, 2009).
Furthermore, these affective associations directly generalize to the
interpretation of new objects or new faces that are perceptually
similar to familiar valenced objects or faces. This model is sup-
ported by the recent finding that participants are able to: (a) learn
that particular valences go with particular faces; (b) (more inter-
estingly) generalize these valences to novel faces that are morphed
to look like the learned-valence faces. In particular, novel faces
morphed with positive exemplars were judged more positively
than novel faces morphed with neutral or negative exemplars
(Verosky and Todorov, 2010).
Such effects may be particularly strong with respect to other-
race attitudes given the well-established visual other-race effect,
in which other-race faces are judged to be more perceptually sim-
ilar to one another as compared to own-race faces (Malpass and
Kravitz, 1969; Ferguson et al., 2001; Tanaka and Pierce, 2009).
Given that implicit attitudes can arise from the automatic evalu-
ation of a face, and that observers transfer the resultant valence
to novel faces that are visually similar (Verosky and Todorov,
2010), we posit that implicit racial attitudes persist because once
a particular association or stereotype arises for one face, it is
generalized to other, perceptually-similar faces. Supporting this
conjecture, we recently found that reducing the visual other-
race effect through perceptual expertise training—so that post-
training other-race faces look perceptually more different from
one another—concomitantly reduced implicit racial biases within
individual participants (Lebrecht et al., 2009).
With respect to the shift in implicit attitudes we report here,
it is our speculation that the extensive media coverage and
the direct advertising1 surrounding Barack Obama’s presidential
campaign and election generated a positive counter-stereotype
that generalized to other black faces. Throughout the 2008 US
presidential campaign images of President Obama’s face were
consistently presented alongside written messages of optimism
such as “HOPE” and “CHANGE” (using salient and unique
facial imagery; Figure 1). For the most part, the media coverage
associated with President Obama has continued to be counter-
stereotypic from that often associated with African-Americans.
As but one example, a study of US news broadcasts in the 1990s
found that 46% of news stories involving African-Americans
presented them as a “threat to or non-contributing victims of
American society” (Entman, 1994). Similarly, Eberhardt et al.
(2004) found that media portrayals are strongly reflected in
individual participant’s associations with African-Americans. For
instance, exposing participants to black faces lowered the percep-
tual threshold for detecting images of crime-relevant objects (e.g.,
guns, knives) and exposing participants to crime-relevant objects
primed attention to black faces. Thus, it appears plausible that
the departure from the norm in media coverage associated with
1In our paper we use of the term “media” to refer both to media coverage, that
is, newspapers, TV news, etc., and to paid advertising, that is, TV commercials,
print ads, direct mail flyers, etc.
FIGURE 1 | Sample media from Barack Obama’s 2008 US presidential
campaign. The visual pairing of Barack Obama’s face with highly positive
words was ubiquitous during the campaign and may have contributed to
the observed change in US participants’ valence associations with black
faces. There is an interesting similarity between the face-word pairings
used in the campaign posters and the positive word trials in the ALPS
measure of implicit bias. (A) Campaign poster presenting the face of Barack
Obama above “HOPE” (which has a positive word rating score of 7.05,
where 0 = most negative, and 9 = most positive—as measured by the
ANEW corpus); (B) Barack Obama next to “CHANGE” (ANEW does not
have a rating for “Change”); (C) Barack Obama’s face above “PROGRESS”
(which has a positive word rating score of 7.73). (A,C) Are Barack Obama
2008 campaign posters created by Rhode Island artist Shepard Fairey
<http://obeygiant.com/>. (B) Is in the public domain and was provided via
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Barack_obama_houston.JPG.
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Obama’s election campaign may have altered the generic valences
US residents associate with black faces and, in turn, altered
the automatic affective evaluation of black faces as measured in
laboratory assessments of implicit racial bias.
Of note, election campaign coverage was particularly promi-
nent in the US college environment in that much of President
Obama’s campaign targeted a younger voting population with
new media (Cave, 2008). Furthermore, Shepard Fairey’s (a Rhode
Island artist) iconic images were highly present on Brown’s col-
lege campus in the form of posters, t-shirts, and stickers. A poll
by the Brown Daily Herald on November 3rd, 2008 found that
86.1% of Brown University students supported Barack Obama
and over 85% of these individuals were registered to vote (Liss,
2008). The Herald further reported that on election night the
campus “exploded in jubilant spontaneous celebration” with stu-
dents pouring onto themain green, then down to the State House,
while students lit fireworks in victory, chanting “Yes, We Can!”
on the steps of public buildings (Fedor, 2008). This same pattern
was repeated throughout the US: 66% of college-age voters sup-
ported President Obama (31% supported Senator McCain) and
over 3.4 million more people aged 18–29 voted in 2008 than in
the previous US presidential election (Cave, 2008).
Whether such a shift in the media portrayal of a racial group
(or a prominent individual from that group) may influence
implicit racial attitudes in the real-world is an open question
that is not easily addressed using traditional laboratory meth-
ods (Schmidt and Nosek, 2010). However, by happenstance we
had access to the measured implicit racial attitudes of two dif-
ferent participant populations that most likely varied in their
exposure to President Obama’s presidential campaign and con-
comitant media coverage: one group of students in the US and
the other group of students in Canada. As such, our study is par-
tially a matter of chance—we had collected measures of implicit
racial bias toward African-Americans in both groups prior to the
2008 US presidential election campaign and collected similar data
post-election in both groups given that we had some indication
that there was a shift in attitudes within our US participants.
That is, making the somewhat controversial assumption that the
popular media, encompassing both advertising and news cover-
age, did have the capacity to alter implicit attitudes, we wondered
whether participants from the US were more likely to show a
shift in attitudes following the presidential election, while par-
ticipants from Canada were more likely to maintain pre-election
attitudes.
For both groups of participants, we measured implicit racial
attitudes using the Affective Lexical Priming Score (ALPS)
(Lebrecht et al., 2009). ALPS uses response times from a lexical
decision task to assess a participant’s implicit racial attitudes—
in many ways ALPS is similar to the Bonafide Pipeline (Fazio
et al., 1995) and is, in some ways, similar to the IAT (Greenwald
et al., 1998). However, both of these commonly-used mea-
sures of implicit attitudes make direct reference to valence in
their tasks. For example, in the race IAT (Greenwald et al.,
1998) participants make categorical decisions about African-
Americans and Caucasian Americans while the two button
presses are shared with the affective categories “good” and “bad”;
in the Bonafide Pipeline (Fazio et al., 1995) participants make
categorical decisions directly on words, judging them as either
“positive” or “negative.”
Critically, ALPS asks participants to perform a lexical decision
task that is unrelated to valence except indirectly via the affective
connotations of the semantically-unrelated words. Lexical deci-
sion tasks, in which participants are presented with a prime and
then decide whether the target letter-string is a real word or a
non-sense word, have been widely used to study semantic priming
(Meyer and Schvaneveldt, 1971). If the prime word is semantically
related to the target (presumably as defined by the organization
of one’s lexicon), participants are faster to make the word/non-
sense word decision as compared to when the prime word is
semantically unrelated (Meyer and Schvaneveldt, 1971). We sug-
gest that the same basic set of psychological processes underlies
the priming of the target words in ALPS, except that the prim-
ing due to the image prime is now occurring along an affective
valence, rather than semantic, dimension. That is to say, if a par-
ticipant evaluates a face as negative then they are likely to be
faster to make a word/non-sense word decision if the target word
is likewise relatively negative (as compared to other words in a
participant’s lexicon). In ALPS the valence of the prime relates
to the valence of the target, irrespective of semantics/meaning.
For example, a face perceived as negative can prime the target
word “cancer” because they are both negative in valence; faces
and cancer are otherwise semantically unrelated. Also of note, in
our use of ALPS positive and negative words are embedded in the
context of many neutral and non-words, leaving the majority of
participants naïve (by self-report) to the goals of our experiment,
and arguably rendering ALPS highly implicit for most partici-
pants. As will be discussed later, we view these specific features
of the socio-cognitive mechanisms underlying ALPS as essential
in accounting for why we apparently saw shifts in implicit racial
attitudes post-election, but a detailed, extremely large-N anal-
ysis of IAT results revealed no such shift (Schmidt and Nosek,
2010).
In that ALPS is a relatively novel method with few published
applications it is worth asking how stable are the positive and
negative valence effects found using ALPS (in contrast, the IAT
has been used in literally 100’s of studies with 1,000,000’s of sam-
ples)? Of relevance is that we have used ALPS with a wide variety
of common objects independently rated to be carrying either pos-
itive or negative valence. Moreover we have used common objects
carrying either strong valences (e.g., IAPs pictures) or “micro-
valences” (e.g., teacups, kettles, chairs, etc.). Critically, results
from ALPS using these common objects are consistent with sev-
eral different methods for obtaining valence ratings. Overall these
results indicate that ALPS is effectively measuring implicit atti-
tudes, but it is the fact that we observed consistent responses
for micro-valenced objects that suggests that ALPS is stable for
more subtle valence differences, such as those seen within a race
(Lebrecht, 2012).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
ETHICS STATEMENT
All pre- and post-election participants gave informed written
consent and were self-reported Caucasians over the age of 18.
All protocols were approved and conducted in accordance with
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the Institutional Review Boards at either Brown University or the
University of Victoria.
PARTICIPANTS
Pre-election
Thirty-four participants were recruited from Brown University
and Providence from 08/02/07–11/05/07. Twenty-four partici-
pants were recruited at the University of Victoria, Canada from
(11/01/07—06/30/08). Note that the date of the US presidential
election was 11/04/08.
Post-election
Thirty participants were recruited from Brown University,
Providence RI from 04/14/09–05/07/09; one participant was
excluded from all reported analyses due to highly variable
response times that fell more than two standard deviations away
from the group mean, leaving an N of 21. Thirty-eight partic-
ipants were recruited from the University of Victoria, Canada
from 06/17/09 to 07/17/09; one participant was excluded because
they self-identified as Asian following participation in the study2
and one participant was excluded due to a failure to follow
instructions during the testing, leaving an N of thirty-six.
STIMULI
Pre-election
Pre-election faces (Providence): Image primes consisted of 144
gray-scale male and female face images of African-American, and
Caucasian individuals selected from the Tarrlab face database
(www.face-place.org). These faces were normalized across race
for luminance using an early version of the SHINE toolbox
(Willenbockel et al., 2010). Faces displayed neutral expressions
and were spatially normalized to an oval template in order to
remove any external cues that could influence face perception
(Figure 3).
Pre-election faces (Victoria): Image primes consisted of 144
gray-scale male face images of African-American, Caucasian, and
Chinese individuals developed in the VizCogLab (and used in
Tanaka and Pierce, 2009) taken originally from the Department
of Corrections face databases from the states of Florida, Arkansas,
Georgia, and Kansas. Internal face features were digitally placed
in a standard face template with identical hairstyle, face contour,
and clothing (Figures 2, 3). External cues (e.g., hairstyle, cloth-
ing) were kept constant. Again, these faces were normalized across
race for luminance using the SHINE toolbox (Willenbockel et al.,
2010).
Pre-election words (Providence and Victoria): Letter-strings
consisted of 144 words divided equally between non-words
and real-words (Figure 2). The real-words were divided equally
between positive, negative, and neutral words taken from the
IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998), the Bonafide Pipeline (Fazio et al.,
1995) and an affective word website: www.winspiration.com (for
a complete word list see Table 1).Word length and frequency were
matched across all conditions, and valence across relevant con-
ditions. The experimenters generated the non-words and then a
2To better control the composition of our participant population with respect
to the perception of other-race faces Asian participants were excluded from
this study.
FIGURE 2 | ALPS (Affective Lexical Priming Score). On each trial
participants were initially presented with either a black or white face image
prime displayed for 250ms. Following a 200ms inter-stimulus interval (ISI),
a letter-string was presented that was either a real word or a non-sense
word. Participants were instructed to decide whether the letter-string was a
real word or a non-sense word (i.e., they were naïve to the true goals of the
experiment). The real words were positive (e.g., “love”), negative (e.g.,
“hate”), or neutral (e.g., “tree”). Each letter-string remained on the screen
until the participant responded word/non-word using one of two computer
keys.
FIGURE 3 | Face images used as primes. (A) Examples of face images
used as primes in the ALPS study run in the US prior to the 2008
presidential election—sample black faces are shown in the left column,
sample white faces are shown in the right column. (B) Examples of face
images used as primes in the ALPS studies run in Canada prior to the 2008
presidential election and in the US and Canada following the 2008
presidential election—sample black faces are shown in the left column,
sample white faces are shown in the right column.
third party checked to ensure they were: (a) pronounceable; (b)
did not sound like any pre-existing word.
Post-election
Post-election faces (Providence and Victoria): Image primes con-
sisted of 630 male face images randomly drawn, within race
condition, from 750 gray-scale male face images of African-
American, Chinese, and Caucasian individuals developed in the
VizCogLab (and used in Tanaka and Pierce, 2009) taken origi-
nally from the Department of Corrections face databases from the
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Table 1 | Pre-election word set.
Positive Negative Neutral Non-words Non-words Non-words
Excellent Hostile Tree Lexolous Tistile Reet
Brilliant Aggressive Building Britalent Gengotten Baulting
Delightful Abandon Bottle Gengerful Mandon Tottle
Desirable Awful Walk Sectible Watful Malk
Fabulous Disturbing Temperature Baggerment Listbing Whelkature
Likable Horrible Think Kirkable Raustible Kinget
Nice Inferior Examine Keecy Jesterior Lexou
Pleasant Irritating Breakfast Lepselant Merritating Trakefas
Superior Nasty Shelves Periors Prasty Slewe
Wonderful Offensive Computer Nounterful Neffentive Lequoter
Joy Repulsive Journal Jop Lepenting Mourmal
Love Rotten Plant Vove Bentotten Patal
Peace Terrifying Radiator Cept Tettifying Raliador
Pleasure Upsetting Task Lepeasure Pusetting Rask
Glorious Agony Left Gloringous Bagony Wheft
Laughter Terrible Movement Hawning Tectible Booment
Happy Distress Television Papney Listress Relifishion
Kind Failure Wall Denk Matilure Nall
Great Evil Water Treget Mevil Preat
Exquisite Hurt Door Exquenite Thurt Linlow
Charming Hate Poster Marming Vate Loster
Adore Disgusting Discuss Radore Gelusting Rolluss
Appealing Rage Observe Popealing Lage Finserve
Attractive Angry Notice Ractive Ditase Foutice
Complete list of positive words, negative words, neutral words, and non-words used as prime targets in the lexical decision component of ALPS run prior to the
2008 US presidential election.
states of Florida, Arkansas, Georgia, and Kansas. Internal face fea-
tures were digitally placed in a standard face template with identi-
cal hairstyle, face contour, and clothing (Figures 2, 3). External
cues (e.g., hairstyle, clothing) were kept constant. Luminance
was normalized within each racial group. Note that although
these face images were different from those face images used
pre-election in Providence, both stimulus sets were highly con-
trolled with respect to the presence of external cues, expression,
and luminance (to compare, see Figure 3). At the same time,
it is important to acknowledge that the use of different face
images may have influenced our results in unintended ways.
For example, it is possible that the African-American faces used
pre-election in Providence were viewed more negatively that the
African-American used post-election. However, this would not
explain the differences we observed post-election between US and
Canadian participants. We return to this point in the General
Discussion.
Post-election words (Providence and Victoria): Letter-strings
consisted of 630 words divided equally between non-words and
real words. Real-words were likewise divided equally between
positive, negative, and neutral words from the ANEW corpus
(Bradley and Lang, 1999). Word length and frequency were
matched across all conditions, and valence across relevant con-
ditions (for a complete word list see Table 2). Non-words were
generated using the ARC non-word database (http://www.maccs.
mq.edu.au/~nwdb/), and checked by a third party to ensure
they were: (a) pronounceable; (b) did not sound like any pre-
existing word. As with the use of different face sets across
conditions, it is possible that this shift between the word sets
may have affected our results. However, while we can create
a scenario in which different sets of face images for a given
race are regarded more positively or negatively, it is difficult
to envision an account whereby the second word set used for
both participant groups post-election would differentially influ-
ence how individuals in those two groups performed lexical
decisions.
Stimuli in all experiments were presented on an LCD monitor
(1024 × 768 resolution) approximately 60 cm from the partici-
pant. This resulted in face primes that subtended a visual angle
of approximately 6–7◦ (horizontal) and 7–8◦ (vertical).
PROCEDURE
Participants completed ALPS as a measure of implicit racial bias
(Figure 2). Similar in nature to the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998),
and the Bonafide Pipeline (Fazio et al., 1995), ALPS (Lebrecht
et al., 2009) was designed to probe attitudes that are automatic
and exempt from conscious control. We predict that affective
priming occurs in ALPS as the result of participants automati-
cally assigning each face prime with a positive or negative valence,
which can in turn facilitate or inhibit response speed on a subse-
quent lexical decision containing positive and negative words. The
perceptual component to ALPS—processing a visually-presented
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Table 2 | Post-election word set.
Positive Negative Neutral Non-words Non-words Non-words
Vacation Dead Banner Trurfs Brids Sluild
Wealthy Ugly Cabinet Ghlapsed Karls Smach
Miracle Fearful Item Rask Nazed Stibe
Excellence Hell Context Skrarge Scarque Trorced
Fireworks Fat Tank Thwof Thett Sponde
Passion Abuse Industry Plooched Thute Calp
Puppy Rape Elevator Sckroaped Spunds Frert
Desire Slaughter Radiator Ghoaned Strumf Sooge
Loved Terrible Taxi Clid Meuth Norl
Sunset Hostage Skeptical Swees Wrurn Plished
Kindness Sickness Errand Ghekes Frisp Skriend
Intimate Hate Ankle Ghanse Shreils Blirth
Champion Suicide Cord Whint Glunge Frenths
Romantic Corpse Barrel Youge Ghlerve Scrept
Sunrise Gloom Anxious Sprect Stive Scried
Angel Punishment Reserved Yomed Whurfs Jict
Happy Toxic Truck Ghroothe Ghots Dwoffed
Rescue Poverty Bandage Skoove Shwoared Sprait
Victory Funeral Glacier Spronged Sman Gwieves
Snuggle Thief Thermometer Sloints Dasps Thwebbs
Cash Nightmare Avenue Smurge Ghafe Tesk
Birthday Rejected Reptile Glend Phreched Shwoast
Improve Crushed Basket Twunks Phlice Twoursed
Orgasm Execution Scissors Kurked Veafs Whenked
Sweetheart Frustrated Foot Spilge Skroaked Prirge
Savior Murderer Startled Sproised Frald Blinned
Pleasure Cancer Locker Stec Trels Twuin
Sexy Stupid Corridor Skerth Thrig Brelm
Joy Hatred Seat Veeced Skousts Sckeethed
Baby Rotten Pamphlet Greems Kreets Trurn
Waterfall Jail Patent Wralve Grynx Zoy
Reward Death Contents Crigs Gwope Slurt
Secure Tumor Chair Zinned Shringed Druds
Graduate Burial Column Rharm Flurs Drymed
Paradise Depression Serious Clauced Slea Krorce
Valentine Unhappy Indifferent Splocs Phroud Jurped
Caress Traitor Knot Caids Gwirst Dwoped
Diploma Ache Spray Phruths Glurf Skusp
Pillow Selfish Month Chigs Shrolfed Shorth
Treasure Ulcer Headlight Flods Ghourned Skreigns
Carefree Hurt Passage Drarve Sckraise Prike
Leader Loneliness Square Sloined Mawped Trawped
Admired Pain Trunk Gweeled Gwells Twames
Fun Lonely Bowl Trut Knords Jorks
Triumph Alone Metal Drength Knaved Snoule
Spouse Killer Building Thist Raluse Hoost
Affection Vomit Paper Mege Knurk Spridged
Glory Infection Mantel Struff Plalc Ghinched
Adorable Violent Tower Splumed Daif Pliped
Joyful Debt Concentrate Twisc Yolf Throoves
Comedy Distressed Non-chalant Sckrets Thwolfed Craides
Handsome Poison Coarse Rhuiche Wask Snilmed
Rainbow Divorce Elbow Skrebe Peagued Plued
(Continued)
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Table 2 | Continued
Positive Negative Neutral Non-words Non-words Non-words
Fame Cruel Cork Scotch Trarve Yinge
Bright Grief Stool Stalmed Doak Thrunks
Liberty Helpless Engine Swarched Ghalp Splooze
Luscious Disloyal News Daths Wulps Thrynes
Delight Illness Butter Fuds Swoin Blauze
Wise Disgusted Statue Skeaps Glirth Sunged
Flirt Drown Hats Thoathe Ghunds Screts
Satisfied Useless Wagon Joots Sparb Stawse
Beach Demon Obey Stronze Shwunks Scracked
Triumphant Troubled Activate Trets Twofts Koove
Holiday Despairing Glass Ning Gwilched Twounged
Aroused Agony Machine Dwelse Ghwoan Twaifs
Proud Misery Lamp Chonged Troz Glayed
Talent Mutilate Finger Kouths Shriefed Cooths
Adventure Hardship Tool Roist Stoft Bloam
Honor Defeated Poster Shrumps Ghlawked Yeight
Beauty Victim Eggs Yitched Smilts Smouthed
Friendly Paralysis Kettle Cenge Cleeled Sckroche
Honest Accident Material Phroch Screlds Dopped
Thoughtful Stress Hammer Preined Smorched Cloils
Acceptance Insult Fork Kurned Glormed Twirds
Wedding Mad Phase Phusk Stirds Knerm
Terrific Sick Iron Wripts Rholk Spreiled
Engaged Insecure Violin Kreeled Ghwurfs Skuns
Gold Sad Lawn Prines Spisp Knaphed
Diamond Ambulance Arms Chites Jeaked Ghren
Merry Afraid Appliance Vinsed Twepe Grirm
Applause Rage Curtains Horged Phrerge Vorled
Success Terrified Hydrant Strimn Alks Ghrodes
Sunlight Starving Icebox Shrogues Pempt Cloached
Trophy Bankrupt Patient Spokeed Skrouds Sckrersed
Cute Betray Non-sense Sckrouled Parps Scrupped
Christmas Assault Theory Thweath Croids Henched
Gift Anguished Pencil Thwulged Phriege Smests
Joke Disaster Hairdryer Stards Gwurls Crerp
Humor Headache Hairpin Clouch Kevved Frong
Confident Tragedy Fabric Strebbs Gwexts Gwatch
Enjoyment Dreadful Inhabitant Funge Sinsed Choys
Luxury Depressed Umbrella Smits Ghifs Lisk
Cuddle Filth Utensil Volf Smaught Skolve
Kiss Bomb Stove Gleps Sckrymn Flemmed
Cheer Torture Aloof Feaks Spost Wrurke
Loyal Anger Journal Shrife Treen Wrard
Lucky Crash Rattle Wruints Skruilds Stuild
Thrill Roach Reverent Flols Spodes Stuids
Laughter Maggot Slush Whurch Sckrairs Trenced
Excitement Upset Quart Shoists Zauled Fleash
Profit Burdened Subdued Spleeve Neaped Bluits
Promotion Lice Chin Crights Krunds Skealed
Ecstasy Failure Blase Thurves Shreft Shalved
Hug Injury Kerchief Phull Phlurs Tamming
Riches Despise Vest Shraim Sploids Chanx
Complete list of positive words, negative words, neutral words, and non-words used as prime targets in the lexical decision component of ALPS run following the
2008 US presidential election.
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face—allows us amethodological tool to link face perception with
affective and social cognition (Lebrecht et al., 2009).
A trial begins by briefly presenting participants with a face for
250ms. In the present student the critical variable was whether
this face prime is Black or White. After a 200ms inter-stimulus
interval (ISI), participants are presented with a target letter-string
that is either positive (e.g., “love”), negative (e.g., “hate”), neutral
(e.g., “tree”), or a non-sense word (e.g., “malk”). The participant
is required to make a binary word/non-sense word decision on
the target letter-string bymaking a keyboard response. This letter-
string remains on the screen until the participant has made their
response or for 1000ms, whichever is shorter, at which point a fix-
ation cross is displayed during a 1000ms inter-trial interval (ITI)
prior to the start of the next trial.
RESULTS
Analyses only include response times that fell within two stan-
dard deviations of the mean for each individual participant—a
standard method used in the behavioral sciences to correct for
skewed response time distributions or outliers. We empirically
examined whether this transformation did what we intended—
take skewed RT data and render it as a more normal distribution.
To that end, we computed a skewness measure for each par-
ticipants’ RTs before and after removing responses beyond ±2
standard deviations. While the raw data showed a mean skewness
of 2.94; the transformed data showed a mean skewness of 1.22.
Thus, the data subject to further analysis was much closer to nor-
mal as preferred for parametric statistical analyses, although this
transformation does not necessarily reduce correlational biases in
our response time data (Sriram et al., 2010). One alternative is
to take the log of individual response time prior to computing
means; however, when we transformed the data in this manner
we observed that although “long-tail” distributions in our data
became less skewed, other distributions, for example those that
had long tails in both directions, were not similarly corrected and,
overall, non-normalities in the data were not uniformly reduced.
Statistical tests were performed on the dependent measure
of group averages of facilitation scores, which were normalized
response times determined as follows: response times within a
given condition were computed for each individual participant
by subtracting their mean response times for positive or neg-
ative words from their mean response time for neutral words.
For example, the degree of facilitation in response time for black
face primes and positive words was calculated by: [black face
primes/neutral word trials—black face primes/positive word tri-
als]. Similar calculations were done for negative word trials and
for white face primes. All analyses were based on the follow-
ing independent factors: Pre-/post-election for time of testing
(between subjects); US/Canada participant groups (between sub-
jects); Race of Prime for face images (black/white; within sub-
jects); Valence of Word for lexical decision (positive/negative;
within subjects).
Pre-election both US and Canadian participants exhibited
the expected pattern of responses consistent with the major-
ity of implicit racial attitudes studies: associating black faces
with a negative valence and white faces with a positive valence
(Figure 4). The 2-way interaction for Race of Prime × Valence
FIGURE 4 | Pre-election vs. post-election priming results. To more
clearly illustrate the interactions of interest, raw priming effects with
between-participant standard errors are shown in (A–D), while
baseline-corrected priming effects—in which the mean for each race face
prime condition is subtracted from the raw priming data—are shown in
(E–H). Baseline-corrected data is shown without the between-participant
standard errors in that the critical illustrative point for these panels is the
within-participant interactions. Before the 2008 US presidential election
participants in both the US and Canada showed a crossover interaction in
which black and white faces differentially primed positive and negative
words (A,B,E,F). Consistent with the extant literature on implicit attitudes,
white faces primed positive words more than negative words, while black
faces primed positive words less than negative words. After the 2008 US
presidential election participants in the US showed a reversal in their
crossover interaction, with black faces also priming positive words more
than negative words (C,G). In contrast, participants in Canada showed a
crossover interaction consistent with their pre-election results, albeit one in
which, although not significant, black faces primed positive words slightly
more than negative words (D,H).
of Word was [F(1, 33) = 4.53, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.12] for US partic-
ipants and [F(1, 23) = 3.63, p = 0.069, η2p = 0.14] for Canadian
participants—these interaction effects are illustrated (E) and (F)
of Figure 4. Note that we observed no significant interaction in
the response times between the two participant populations pre-
election—the 3-way interaction for Race of Prime × Valence
of Word × US/Canada was [F(1, 56) = 909, p = 0.34] and the
Race of Prime × Valence of Word interaction across US and
Canadian participants was [F(1, 56) = 5.87, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.10].
These interactions reflected the same pattern typically found in
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other studies of implicit attitudes: white faces primed positive
words significantly more than black faces primed positive words
across US and Canadian participants [t(57) = 2.02, p < 0.05, d =
0.41]. More specifically, for US participants, pre-election, black
faces primed negative words more than positive words, although
this difference was not significant, [t(33) = −1.14, p = 0.26, d =
−0.26], while for Canadian participants, pre-election, black faces
primed negative words more than positive words [t(23) = -2.29,
p < 0.05, d = −0.39]; for US participants, pre-election, white
faces primed positive words more than negative words [t(33) =
2.15, p < 0.05, d = 0.45], while for Canadian participants, pre-
election, white faces did not prime positive words more than
negative words [t(23) = 0.35, p = 0.73, d = 0.06].
Given that we did not expect to find differences between data
collected pre- and post-election, we continued to refine ALPS
and, post-election, employed a new, larger word set that was
intended to increase the sensitivity of ALPS to implicit attitudes
(Bradley and Lang, 1999). As discussed in elsewhere in this paper,
these refinements led to some confounds in how strongly we
can interpret our unexpected findings—ideally, identical (and
refined) image and word sets would have been used pre- and post-
election in both the US and Canada. However, even in the context
of these less-than-desirable variations among stimuli we are hard
pressed to identify mechanistic reasons as to why these stimu-
lus differences would have resulted in the shifts we observed in
implicit attitudes. For example, the black faces used post-election
are more negative in appearance as compared to the black faces
used pre-election in Providence, yet it was post-election that black
faces were associated with more positive words. One difference
between word sets that we should highlight is that the new word
set resulted much faster responses to positive words regardless
of prime type. This is reflected in a significant main effect of
word valence in the combined post-election, US and Canadian
dataset [F(1, 63) = 21.5, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.25]. That is, in the
post-election experiments, regardless of the prime, participants
were faster overall to identify a word as a word if it was positive as
compared to if it was negative. Although this main effect does not
impact the significance of our overall findings, it does make them
harder to interpret. This is reflected in the different scales used
for plotting priming scores in the pre- and post-election graphs
(Figure 4). At the same time, the critical comparison between our
post-election US and post-election Canadian participants is based
on data collected using the sameword set, and therefore measured
on the same scale.
The central question is whether US and Canadian implicit
attitudes toward black faces changed over time. As already
stated, before the 2008 US presidential election, participants
in the US and in Canada both showed a negative association
with black faces. However, after the election, US participants
showed a reversal in the attitudes they associated with black
faces (Figures 4C,G). The 2-way interaction for Race of Prime ×
Valence of Word was [F(1, 28) = 1.79, p = 0.19] for US partici-
pants and [F(1, 35) = 2.60, p = 0.12] for Canadian participants—
these interaction effects are illustrated (G) and (H) of Figure 4.
Critically, in contrast to our pre-election results, we observed
a significant interaction in the response times between the two
participant populations post-election—the 3-way interaction for
Race of Prime × Valence of Word × US/Canada was [F(1, 63) =
4.31, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.06]. More specifically, this interaction
reflected a pattern that is not typically found in studies of implicit
attitudes: for US participants, post-election, black faces primed
positive wordsmore than negative words [t(28) = 3.57, p < 0.001,
d = 0.52], while for Canadian participants, post-election, black
faces did not prime positive words more than negative words
[t(35) = 1.47, p = 0.15, d = 0.29]; for US participants, post-
election, white faces did not prime positive words more than neg-
ative words [t(28) = 1.36, p = 0.18, d = 0.24], while for Canadian
participants, post-election, white faces primed positive words
more than negative words [t(35) = 3.29, p < 0.01, d = 0.36]. The
fact that we did not find a significant difference for US partici-
pants in the degree to which white faces primed positive words
as compared to negative words is somewhat puzzling (although
the trend is still in the expected direction)—we speculate that
this may have been an artifact of much faster responses associated
with positive words in the post-election word set. As addressed
in Lebrecht (2012) shorter response times in the lexical decision
component of ALPS lead to reduced priming effects.
This reversal in implicit attitudes with respect to black faces
in US participants was reflected in a significant 3-way interac-
tion for Race of Prime × Valence of Word × Pre-/Post-Election
[F(1, 61) = 4.84, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.07] (Figures 4E,G). In con-
trast, Canadian participants did not show a significant 3-way
interaction for Race of Prime × Valence of Word × Pre-/Post-
Election [F(1, 58) = 2.24, p = 0.14] (Figures 4F,H). That is, for
Canadian participants, the pattern in measured attitudes did not
change significantly before and after the 2008 election. However
the 4-way interaction for Race of Prime × Valence of Word ×
US/Canada × Pre-/Post-Election was not significant [F(1, 119) =
2.10, p = 0.15]—although since the Canadian group was trend-
ing in the same direction as the US group post-election, one
might not expect this interaction to be significant. Indeed, for
Canadian participants the shift in a positive direction with respect
to the degree to which black faces primed positive words hints that
whatever societal factors influenced our US participants’ implicit
attitudes, the same factors may have been, to a lesser extent, in
play for our Canadian participants. Supporting this conjecture,
although entirely anecdotal, many Canadians report that there
was extremely strong support for President Obama in the run up
to the 2008 election. At the same time, we note that a record set-
ting $745 million was spent by the Obama campaign in the 2008
election (Queen and Hilland, 2009)—money spent specifically to
influence US voters’ beliefs about the candidates. However, we
should be very cautious in this interpretation in that both the
US and the Canadian participants were assessed using new sets of
face stimuli and words—thus, any common shift may have been
partially attributable to these factors.
Reviewing our results, our strongest evidence for a shift in
implicit attitudes in US participants, but not Canadian partic-
ipants, across the 2008 US presidential election is a significant
3-way interaction for Race of Prime × Valence of Word ×
US/Canada following the election. In contrast, this same 3-way
interaction was not significant before the election. Of particular
note, during the post-election time period in which these data
were collected in the US, President Obama’s US approval ratings
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ranged from 62–66% (Woolley and Peters, 2013); similarly, dur-
ing the time period in which these data were collected in Canada,
President Obama’s US approval ratings3 ranged from 57–61%
(Woolley and Peters, 2013). Both of these ranges are quite high
relative to the mid-to-low 40’s approval ratings typically observed
throughout 2010 until the Fall of 2012—leading up to and fol-
lowing the 2012 election, his approval ratings rose slightly into
the low 50’s (Woolley and Peters, 2013). As such it would be dif-
ficult to recreate the positive light in which President Obama was
regarded following the 2008 election.
DISCUSSION
Across four laboratory assessments of implicit racial attitudes,
between 2007 and 2009, we observed a reversal in the implicit
attitudes associated with black faces for US participants only; sur-
prisingly, Canadian participants did not show a similar change
in attitudes. Notably, our first two experiments were run prior to
November of 2008 and our second two experiments were run after
November of 2008. Thus, later in time, US participants implic-
itly associated black faces with positively valenced words, whereas
earlier they had implicitly associated black faces with negatively
valenced words. In contrast, over the same time period Canadian
participants continued to implicitly associate black faces with
negatively valenced words. In and of itself, this pattern is rather
puzzling. However, as with the general population, we were per-
sonally subject to the high saliency of President Obama’s election
in November of 2008. In this context, it seemed natural for us
to speculate that this historic event had some impact on the
measured implicit racial attitudes of our participants.
Reinforcing our conjectures at the time, a special section
assessing the impact of President Obama’s election appeared in
the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (Cooper, 2009).
Perhaps most striking among the several articles was Plant et al.’s
report that they had observed a post-election decrease in implicit
racial attitudes toward African-Americans as measured by the IAT
(Plant et al., 2009). Similarly, another study reported that the elec-
tion of President Obama influenced test-taking performance of
African-American and Caucasian students by chronicling perfor-
mance of African-American students before and after the election
(Marx et al., 2009). Even further afield, but perhaps explainable
through a change in negative implicit attitudes toward African-
Americans, some criminologists and economists noted a possible
“Obama Effect” in a decrease in violent crime in the US in 2009
and 2010 (Dubner, 2011). Criminologist Alfred Blumstein com-
mented that “The one striking event that comes to mind is the
inauguration of our first African-American president, a particu-
larly salient event in this context . . . ” and cites data that indicate
a higher reduction in the number of arrests of African-Americans
as compared to Caucasians—indeed, for drug use offenses, the
reduction was 3.3% for African-Americans, while there was actu-
ally an increase of 2.0% over the same period for Caucasians
(Dubner, 2011).
Thus, we felt and continue to feel that is reasonable to present
our findings in the same context as other social cognition studies
3We were unable to find a source for US Presidential approval ratings for
Canadian residents.
addressing similar questions. At the same time, we acknowledge
the limitations of any hypothesis positing a specific real-world
event as a causal mechanism must necessarily remain specula-
tive, in that it is impossible to recreate/replay transient, historical
events or precisely mimic their structure in a laboratory setting.
That is, there is no way we can draw a causal link between our
pre- and post-election measurements of implicit attitudes and
any specific intervening event, highly-salient and theory-relevant
or not. This concern becomes even more real when we con-
sider the recent results presented in Schmidt and Nosek (2010).
As noted earlier, these authors report that a large-N analysis of
implicit racial attitudes as measured by the IAT revealed no shift
in attitudes across the time period before and after the 2008
US presidential election. More fine-grained analyses also sup-
port this general finding: for example, the level of accessibility to
Barack Obama, as measured by the number of daily news arti-
cles containing the word “Obama,” did not reliably influence daily
measures of implicit racial attitudes. Similarly, analyses predicated
on social group membership or political orientation revealed
only minimal shifts in implicit racial attitudes, as did analyses
centering around important dates in President Obama’s candi-
dacy and election (Schmidt and Nosek, 2010). With respect to
Plant et al.’s (2009) finding of decreased levels of implicit racial
bias toward African-Americans, Schmidt andNosek (2010) found
no evidence that targeted participant samples meant to mirror
those used in Plant et al. (2009) exhibited a similar decrease
in levels of implicit bias. To address this discrepancy, Schmidt
and Nosek offer two explanations. First, it is possible that the
decrease observed in Plant et al. (2009) is a Type I error (given
the large preponderance of evidence Schmidt and Nosek argue
that the appropriate null assumption is that participants will show
positive bias toward Caucasians and negative bias toward African-
Americans). Second, it is possible that unknown “situational”
factors may have come into play in the laboratory collection of
data in Plant et al. (2009; e.g., posters or other media in the
laboratory that conveyed counter-stereotypical exemplars or ide-
als). Acknowledging that these two alternative explanations are
reasonable in and of themselves, we note that our results are con-
sistent with Plant et al.’s original explanation for their observed
decrease in levels of implicit bias. However, in contrast to our
findings, Plant et al. did not report, as we do, a significant rever-
sal with respect to implicit attitudes toward African-Americans.
Thus, it is possible that Schmidt and Nosek’s alternative accounts
of Plant et al.’s result remain valid, but do not necessarily apply to
the findings we report here.
What factors then, might account for our results vis a vis
those reported in Plant et al. (2009) and Schmidt and Nosek
(2010)? Although like Plant et al. (2009) we collected our data
in a laboratory setting, we are skeptical that this factor alone is
sufficient to explain either a decrease or a reversal in implicit
attitudes. In particular, we are confident that our laboratory con-
texts neither implicitly or explicitly conveyed “egalitarian ideals”
(Schmidt and Nosek, 2010). Thus, we concur with Schmidt and
Nosek’s point that “there is no reason to expect that the effect
of Obama’s candidacy could only be observed when participants
visited a laboratory.” In this light, we view the most plausi-
ble explanation for our results as a concatenation of locale and
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measurement instrument. With regard to the former, we have
already noted that the Providence and Brown University popula-
tions were highly supportive of President Obama and that some of
the iconic imagery of his campaign originated there. With regard
to the latter, it is self-evident that the IAT and ALPS are differ-
ent tools for assessing implicit attitudes. As such, it seems likely
that they tap into different cognitive mechanisms and may pro-
duce discrepant results depending on a wide variety of factors.
More specifically, the IAT relies on a form of response compe-
tition between two active concepts that is likely related to the
classic “Stroop” paradigm (Klauer, 1997), whereas ALPS relies
on fluency within the lexicon that is likely related to semantic
(Meyer and Schvaneveldt, 1971) or affective priming (Klauer,
1997). Indeed, there is evidence that affective lexical priming
instruments such as ALPS rely on a prime-target relationship
whereby automatic processing of the prime “spreads” to other
lexical entries that share the same valence direction (Klauer, 1997;
Wentura, 2000). In contrast, instruments such as the IATmay rely
on the independent evaluation of the two competing potential
responses and, depending on the task, valence congruency may
either facilitate or interfere with the participant’s actual evalua-
tive responses (Klauer, 1997). Although clearly a good deal more
work is required to pinpoint differences in the cognitive mech-
anisms underlying the IAT and ALPS, we speculate that because
there is no overt reference to social group or affect within ALPS,
any effects of valence are likely to be entirely unconscious—as
such ALPS may be somewhat more sensitive to subtleties in some
aspects of implicit attitudes. Finally, as we have already noted,
there is a striking congruency between the media images used in
the presidential campaign (Figure 1) and the structure of ALPS
(Figure 2)—it is possible that we unintentionally stumbled onto
the ideal instrument for assessment the effect of this particular
media.
We should note—as already discussed—that there are two
potential confounds that cloud any interpretation of our data:
the change in word set and the change in face set pre- and post-
election. Although the new word set appears to have produced
much faster responses to positive words as compared to nega-
tive words, it is difficult to envision how this effect might have
interacted with the race of the faces used as primes or with any
particular participant group. With respect to the new face set,
two logical points argue against any idiosyncratic influence for
a particular set of faces for any particular participant group. First,
different faces were used for US and Canadian participants pre-
election—yet these two pre-election participant groups showed
the same pattern of results. In contrast, the same faces were
used for US and Canadian participants post-election—yet these
two post-election participant groups showed different patterns
of results. Second, the Department of Corrections face stimuli
used for both post-election participant groups were, if anything,
more negative in overall appearance relative to more “typical”
experimental face stimuli (e.g., the faces used for the US pre-
election participant group were Brown University community
members—mostly undergraduate students). As such, one might
have expected stronger negative implicit attitudes for such faces—
yet the only observed reversal of the typically-seen negative
implicit attitudes for black faces occurred with these nominally
more negative faces. Thus, there appears to be little evidence
to support an argument that differences across the face stimuli
used in each condition underlie any of our theoretically-relevant
effects.
Finally, we should note that our sample sizes were relatively
small as compared to those reported in Schmidt and Nosek
(2010), but only slightly smaller than those reported in Plant et al.
(2009). However, the sample size of our study is not particularly
atypical or small as compared to the extensive extant literature
in cognitive psychology (or even social cognition until recently).
Indeed, many priming studies of non-social processes, for exam-
ple, lexical priming, have used equivalent or fewer subjects per
a condition (e.g., Meyer and Schvaneveldt, 1971, used 12 partic-
ipants per an experiment). Thus, de facto, there is no reason to
assume that our sample size is small in and of itself. That being
said, we want to be up front about the relatively low power of
our study, where power is a result of not just sample size, but
the strength of the effect(s): to be clear, the effects we report are
relatively fragile and we agree that additional samples would be
desirable. However, as discussed in detail, in our rather unusual
case, this is not possible.
Beyond these non-theory-relevant factors—context, differ-
ent measurement instruments, different stimulus sets, size of
sample—perhaps the most compelling aspect of our study is
that we were able to compare two populations that were, nom-
inally, differentially exposed to media about President Obama
both pre- and post-election. Thus, we were able to establish that
the changes in implicit attitudes observed in our US partici-
pants were not found in a non-US population with arguably less
exposure to US election coverage. As mentioned earlier, several
studies have shown that exposure to salient counter-examples can
serve as a significant moderator of racial bias in short-term train-
ing and in group-level gender bias differences (Kawakami et al.,
2000; Blair, 2002; Dasgupta and Asgari, 2004). Insofar as our
assessment of post-election behavior included no experimenter-
directed instruction or experimental construct—either implicit
or explicit—that would indicate that either participant popula-
tion should suppress implicit negative racial stereotypes, we posit
that our results speak to the influence of repeated exposure to a
salient counter-stereotypic real-world exemplar. Put another way,
in order for implicit attitudes to change measurably at the group
level (i.e., for a significant sample of the tested Brown undergrad-
uates), some salient event must have precipitated a considerable
change in the overall stereotypes associated with the racial group
in question. Of course, we have no way of directly measuring
what might have caused this real-life change across our groups
of participants. However, as with others in the field, we can retro-
spectively theorize as to what event in the past several years could
be so significant, and unique to our US participants, as to pro-
duce a reversal in a student population’s implicit attitudes toward
African-Americans. It is our conjecture that the election of the
United States’ first African-American president concomitant with
extensive media coverage was the primary factor.
In order to better understand how one exemplar, Barack
Obama, might have facilitated the reversal of implicit attitudes
attributed to an entire race, we focus on a specific perceptual
mechanism: the “Other Race Effect” (ORE) (Malpass and Kravitz,
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1969). The ORE is defined as an individual’s superior ability
to visually individuate faces drawn from the race which that
individual was most frequently exposed to during development,
as compared to faces drawn from a race they encountered less
frequently (Bar-Haim et al., 2006). Most commonly, this effect
is experienced as other-race faces looking more similar to one
another (despite no difference in actual image similarity rela-
tive to the familiar-race faces). Along with strong evidence to
suggest that the ORE is a perceptual effect (Tanaka et al., 2004;
Tanaka and Pierce, 2009; McGugin et al., 2011), there is evi-
dence to suggest that it also impacts socio-cognitive mechanisms,
such as implicit racial attitudes (Ferguson et al., 2001; Hugenberg
et al., 2007; Lebrecht et al., 2009). We suggest that the ORE and
implicit racial attitudes are linked in that if observers are poorer
at perceptually differentiating other-race faces, they are less likely
to make individual-level social attributions and more likely to
make group-level social attributions. This decreased likelihood of
observers making individual social attributions with black faces
presents a challenge to breaking down group-level attributions.
Stereotypes typically generalize across much of a group, and per-
ceptual processing of other-race faces may in fact reinforce these
broad generalizations. That is, if other-race faces are perceptually
more similar to one another, it is more likely that a single label
will be applied across individuals of that race.
We further hypothesize that implicit attitudes arise when affec-
tive associations are reactivated during face perception: faces are
automatically evaluated as positive or negative. Because other-
race faces are perceptually more similar, the affective associations
that are reactivated in perception are more poorly differentiated
and attitudes generated from these associations will be more likely
to overlap. This proposed framework is supported by Verosky
and Todorov’s (2010) finding that participants rate novel faces
(20–35% morphs) more positively or negatively based on their
perceptual similarity to learned affective faces. In the context of a
valence continuum, other-race faces will then cluster within a nar-
rower range relative to own-race faces (Figure 5). Pre-election, we
posit that black faces were localized toward the negative end of the
continuum due to negative racial stereotypes (Fazio et al., 1995;
Greenwald et al., 1998) and the predominantly negative news
coverage of African-American individuals (Entman, 1994). Post-
election for our US participants, this cluster may be anchored
around a more positive location along the continuum, as black
faces may have been perceived as similar to President Obama’s
highly positive face (Figure 5). We posit that observers typically
show implicit positive attitudes for own-race faces based on the
same principles. That is, in contrast to the perceptual cluster-
ing of other-race faces, most observers should have sufficient
perceptual expertise to accurately and automatically differenti-
ate own-race faces (Lebrecht et al., 2009). As our participants
were Caucasian, we posit that they perceived own-race faces (i.e.,
Caucasian faces) to be more spread out along the valence con-
tinuum (Figure 5). Yet oddly, in our study we do not consistently
observe the expected positive attitudes for white faces. Our admit-
tedly post-hoc explanation for this finding may be that the faces
used as stimuli (both black and white) were particularly negative
in appearance given that they were taken from a Department of
Corrections face database (of note, this bias would work against
FIGURE 5 | The valence Continuum. The valence continuum (A)
illustrates the hypothesis that faces and objects are automatically evaluated
with respect to a metric of positive or negative based on affective
associations. Valences for faces and objects can be organized on a
continuum that ranges from strongly positive to strongly negative.
Pre-election, on average, black faces elicited negative
associations—supported by black faces priming negative words more so
than positive words. As illustrated in (B), this posits that, pre-election, black
faces were clustered at the negative end of the valence continuum. Note
that this clustering is, at least in part, a product of the ORE, namely that for
the majority of Caucasian participants black faces look more similar to one
another as compared to white faces. Thus, the affective associations and
concomitant implicit biases overlap for Caucasians encountering
African-Americans. (C) Notably for US participants only the position of this
cluster shifts to the positive end of the continuum post-election, as
suggested the data reported in this paper. (D) Similar clustering would not
seen for Caucasian participants looking at white face primes in that
participants are better able to perceptually discriminate between own-race
faces, and so associate individual primes with lower overlapping valences.
This greater variability in valence for own-race individuals may help account
for why we observed a more consistent positive association with black
faces as compared to white faces for participants in Providence.
our actual observation of a shift toward positive attitudes for black
faces drawn from the same face database).
Finally, we should also acknowledge that a limitation of our
present study (as well as in Plant et al., 2009) is that we have no
means for assessingmedia exposure (positive or negative) as expe-
rienced by students at Brown University or at the University of
Victoria in Canada.We speculate that while Canadian news orga-
nizations certainly did cover the US election, there were a variety
of factors that may have contributed to change we observed:
extremely positive coverage of President Obama’s election cam-
paign at Brown, overwhelmingly strong support for President
Obama on campus, the fact that President Obama’s brother-
in-law was the head coach of the Brown basketball team from
2006–2008 (he resigned from this position to help with the
campaign), an African-American president at Brown since 2001,
and, finally, Providence as the home of the creator of the strik-
ing Barack Obama “HOPE” images (Figure 1). Thus, Brown—a
notably liberal campus with direct ties to President Obama—
may have been the ideal “petri dish” for observing any shift in
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the implicit attitudes arising from the 2008 election. Of course,
although this reported shift in implicit racial attitudes appears
to be a positive change, we wish to reiterate that a single label,
positive or negative, is clearly inadequate to characterize individ-
uals within any race. In that our present results suggest that such
labeling is potentially malleable even within non-laboratory con-
texts, we should be aware that future salient events may influence
these and other attitudes as expressed by real-world populations.
In this context we hope that as a field we can be opportunistic—
assessing, when possible, whether the effects we present here are
replicable using ALPS or other measures of implicit attitudes, as
well as whether any observed effects are population general or
interact with participants’ perceptual experiences (e.g., Lebrecht
et al., 2009) and/or personal biases.
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